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Abstract
Emerging economy firms are increasingly acquiring foreign firms, either buoyed by success at 
home or as a response to competitive threats from foreign players entering their home markets.  
These firms are new to the game and it remains to be seen if they have been able to secure gains 
for their  shareholders in the process. This study analyzed international acquisitions by Indian 
firms and found that shareholder gains are positive overall. However, larger firm size tends to 
have a negative impact  on shareholder  returns suggesting that  bigger  firms may be prone to 
hubris. Managerialism was not found to be a significant.
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INTRODUCTION
Cross-border acquisitions  (foreign companies  taking over  domestic  companies)  are  important 
international  business  transactions.  Until  recently,  the  acquiring  companies  used  to  come 
invariably from the developed economies but the picture has changed over the past few years. 
Companies from emerging economies are acquiring foreign firms at a rapid pace, a large number 
of their targets being in the developed economies. As early as 2004, the number of acquisitions 
made by emerging economy firms in developed economies were outnumbered by those made by 
developed economy firms in the emerging economies by 1:4 but the ratio changed to 1:3 by 2006 
and further to 1:2 by the end of 2007 (KPMG, 2008).
Acquiring  a  large  number  of  firms  abroad is  one  thing  but  doing it  successfully  is  another. 
Emerging  economy  firms  not  only  are  new  to  the  game  but  also  have  very  different 
characteristics than developed country firms. Unlike American firms, a large number of Chinese 
firms, for example, are owned or controlled by the Chinese government while the ownership and 
control  of  a  significant  number  of  Indian  firms  is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  few large 
shareholders  (often  families).  The  opportunities  and  risks  of  engaging  in  international 
acquisitions are therefore likely to be very different for emerging economy firms but there is 
virtually no empirical investigation into the performance of international acquisitions done by 
them. The purpose of this study is to find out if acquisitions of foreign firms has been beneficial 
for Indian firms and to test the applicability of existing theoretical explanations of acquisition 
performance in the context of Indian firms.
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ACQUISITIONS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
Performance of acquisitions has been traditionally measured in terms of shareholder wealth. The 
logic is that if the acquisition is beneficial to the companies, it will show up in their share prices 
(assuming the stock market is efficient).
Synergy  has  been  identified  as  the  primary  reason  for  shareholder  gains  as  a  result  of 
acquisitions. An acquisition is synergistic when the combination of the acquiring firm and the 
target firm is worth more than the sum of the values of the acquiring firm and the target firm as 
independent entities. Bradley, Desai & Kim (1983) produced evidence of synergy and identified 
several  synergy  creating  mechanisms  viz.  better  management,  economies  of  scale,  improved 
production techniques, the combination of complementary resources, increased market power, 
redeployment of assets to more profitable uses etc. Empirically, synergy will lead to an overall 
shareholder gain i. e. the sum of  target firm shareholder gains and the acquiring firm shareholder 
gains shall be positive for a synergistic acquisition.
Roll (1986) argued that the target firm usually has a market price which serves as the lower 
bound for the valuation of the target by the bidder. Even if the target firm is not publicly traded  
on a market, the existence of a public firm which is similar to the target firm or the existence of 
previous deals involving similar firms serves as a benchmark. A rational target firm will not sell 
below the market price (or the benchmark price) and therefore the target firm should always 
have positive shareholder gains. In other words, the acquiring firm needs to share the potential 
synergy gains with the target firm for the transaction to occur i. e. the bidder needs to pay a 
premium to convince the target to sell. The literature has consistently found that target gains are 
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indeed positive (Jensen, 1988; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Kang, 1993). Synergy is the positive 
sum of target and acquiring firm gains and since target gains are always positive, an acquisition 
can be regarded as synergistic if the gains of the acquiring firm shareholders are positive.
Hypothesis 1. Synergistic acquisitions will lead to positive gains for acquiring firm 
shareholders
The  literature  suggests  two  main  reasons  for  shareholder  loss  through  acquisitions  namely 
managerialism and hubris. The managerialism hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Seth, Song 
& Pettit,  2000)  is  based  on the  premise  that  managers  may have  goals  or  interests  that  are 
incompatible with the interests of the shareholders. Managers may acquire other firms simply to 
grow the size of their firms even if a larger firm size reduces shareholder wealth. They may do so 
for the status and prestige of managing a larger firm or because a larger firm increases their job 
security. The problem of managerialism shall be greater in firms where owners are different from 
managers. In a large number of Indian firms, however, the owners not only possess a controlling 
stake but are also actively engaged in the management of the firm. Such owner-managers are 
known as promoters in India. At the same time, there are many Indian firms where ownership 
and control is well separated between owners and managers. India therefore provides an ideal 
setting to test the existence and the consequences of managerialism. When the promoters hold a 
controlling stake in a firm, there is little scope for managerialism because the owners and the 
managers are the same.  It is reasonable, therefore, to argue that promoter controlled firms will 
have reduced managerialism  and will therefore create higher value through acquisitions. 
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Hypothesis 2. Firms in which promoters hold a controlling stake shall create greater 
    value through acquisitions than those in which promoters do not have a controlling stake.
Another  hypothesis  for  shareholder  loss  through  acquisitions  is  the  hubris  hypothesis  (Roll, 
1986)  according to which the bidder firms overestimate the potential synergies and therefore 
simply overpay the target. One reason for this is the overconfidence of the managers which leads 
them to errors. Hubris is hard to measure and therefore many authors take negative gains as 
evidence of hubris but gains can also be negative due to managerialism and therefore the effects 
of managerialism and hubris need to be separated. In one of the rare studies that deals with hubris 
directly, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) showed that CEO overconfidence results in acquiring 
firms paying a higher premium for the target. Hubris leads to errors in the valuation of the target 
and such errors can be attributed to the board of directors and owners as much as to the CEO. 
Large size of the firm and successful prior performance are two possible candidates that can lead 
to hubris independent of the agency problem. Hayward & Hambrick (1997) used these variables 
but since the focus of their study was CEO behavior, they reasoned that big size and previous 
success cause CEO hubris. In contrast, I argue that big size and previous success can make the 
managers, the board and even the owners prone to over confidence and hence mistakes in target 
valuation. In a detailed study linking firm size and acquisition returns, Moeller, Schlingemann & 
Stulz  (2004) provide evidence that large firms are more prone to hubris than small firms and 
therefore acquisitions done by larger firms result in lower returns for their shareholders. In their 
words, “Managers of large firms might be more prone to hubris, perhaps because they are more 
important socially, have succeeded in growing the firm, or simply face fewer obstacles in making 
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acquisitions because their firm has more resources” (Moeller et. al. 2004, pp 3).
Hypothesis 3. Shareholders of larger firms are more likely to face lower acquisition 
returns as compared to shareholders of smaller firms.
Hypothesis 4. Successful prior performance will lead to lower acquisition returns.
DATA & METHODS
A list of all completed and majority cross-border acquisitions made by S&P CNX 500 firms was 
obtained  from  the  Thomson  Financial  M&A  database.  S&P  CNX  500  is  a  broad-based 
benchmark  of  the  Indian  capital  market.  It  represented  about  84.24%  of  the  total  market 
capitalization and about 78% of the total  turnover on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of 
India as on March 31, 2008. The S&P CNX 500 companies are disaggregated into 72 industries 
and the industry weights in the index reflect the industry weights in the market. A total of 365 
deals were thus obtained out of which two didn't have an acquisition date.  Figure 1 shows the 
histogram of these deals and reflects the rapid rise of international acquisitions in recent years.
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Fig. 1. Histogram of the Number of Deals (N = 363)
Government controlled firms and firms which are majority controlled by foreigners were then 
excluded because they may have different motivations and constraints than other Indian firms. 
The acquisition details were verified from various sources e. g. the corporate disclosures to the 
Indian stock exchanges, newspaper reports etc. Only those deals for which the acquisition details 
could be verified from multiple sources were included to avoid any measurement errors. When 
multiple corporate events occurred near the acquisition date, the deals were removed from the 
sample.
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the performance of cross-border acquisitions measured as the change 
in  shareholder  wealth.  Event  study  methodology  has  been  used  to  calculate  the  cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CAR) for the shares of the acquiring firms on the Indian stock market. This 
method is the most widely used method for measuring the performance of acquisitions (Harris & 
Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides & Ittner, 1994). The announcement of acquisition is the event of 
interest  and  the  reaction  of  the  stock  market  is  used  to  calculate  CAR.  The first  step  is  to  
calculate  the abnormal returns ( Rabnormal ) as the difference between the actual  return and the 
expected return in the stock market. 
Formally, Rabnormalit =R actualit −R expected it 
where Rabnormal  = abnormal return for firm i in time t and so on 
Expected return is calculated using the following model 
Rexpected it = Rmarket it   where Rmarket it   = market return for firm i in time t 
The parameters alpha and beta were estimated for a period 136 to 16 days prior to the acquisition  
announcement date following Doukas & Travlos (1988). Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
a firm was then obtained by adding the abnormal returns for the firm over a short time window 
around the announcement date. News of the acquisition may precede the formal announcement 
by  the  firm  by  a  day  or  two  or  the  stock  market  may  take  a  day  or  two  to  react  if  the 
announcement  is  made after  the market  is  closed or if  the announcement  reaches  the whole 
market with some lag. Total returns over a short time window were therefore used instead of 
abnormal return on the announcement date. Moreover, there might be errors in measuring the 
exact announcement date and the short time window helps capture the exact date of the event in 
that case.  Considering the announcement date as day zero, two time windows of -1 to +1 days 
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(CAR1DAY) and -2 to +2 days (CAR2DAY) were therefore used to calculate CAR. Positive 
CAR indicates that the acquisition has created value for the shareholders and vice versa. 
Independent Variables 
Promoter Stake – A binary variable representing the presence or absence of a controlling stake 
by  the  promoters  of  the  Indian  firm making  the  acquisition. Promoters  are  owners  that  are 
actively engaged in the management of the firm. The data was obtained from the two main stock 
exchanges in India – the National Stock Exchange and the Bombay Stock Exchange. A value of 
one represents more than 50% stake and a value of zero represents less than or equal to 50% 
stake.
Firm size  – Firm size has been measured as the log of net sales in the closest quarter one year 
prior to the acquisition date. The process for the selection and evaluation of target starts much 
before the acquisition announcement date and therefore the sales figure are measured one year 
prior to the announcement date. Quarterly figures were used instead of yearly figures to ensure 
that the same time period is used for all deals e. g. if yearly March figures would have been used, 
acquisitions  made in  April  would have a  different  time period between the time the sales is 
measured and the announcement date than the acquisition made in December.
Firm performance -  Prior firm performance is measured as the ratio of net profit to net sales in 
the closest quarter one year prior to the acquisition date. Quarterly figures one year prior to the 
announcement date were used for reasons discussed above.
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Control Variables 
Previous literature suggests that related acquisitions are likely to result  in greater shareholder 
gains than unrelated acquisitions. An acquisition was termed related and coded as one if the 2-
digit SIC code of the acquiring firm industry and the target firm industry were the same. The 
unrelated acquisitions were coded as zero. Prior acquisition experience in the target country and 
general  experience  of  making  international  acquisitions  has  also  been  found  to  positively 
influence  acquisition  performance.  Prior  acquisition  experience  in  the  target  country  was 
measured as the number of acquisitions made in the target country previous to the deal in the 
sample.  International  acquisition  experience  was  measured  as  the  number  of  international 
acquisitions  done  previous  to  the  deal  in  the  sample.  Another  variable  that  can  affect  the 
acquisition  performance  is  the  exchange  rate  between  the  currencies  of  the  acquiring  firm 
country and the target firm country. Fluctuations in the exchange rate will affect not only the 
valuation of the deal but also the reaction of the stock market.  While the firm may take into 
account  long-term fluctuations  before  choosing  the  target,  short  term  fluctuations  are  much 
harder  to  predict.  The variable  was therefore  measured  as  the  change in  the  value  of  target 
country currency vis a  vis  the home currency (Indian Rupee)  on the announcement  date,  as 
compared  to  its  value  one  year  before  the  announcement  date.  In  other  words,  the  variable 
represents the change in the strength of the home currency (Indian Rupee) relative to the host 
currency.
A final list of 246 deals was obtained for which all the variables were available. The summary 
statistics is presented in Table 1 and the correlation matrix is tabulated in Table 2. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
One sample  t-tests  were  performed  on CAR1DAY and CAR2DAY to  ascertain  if  these  are 
significantly different from zero (Table 3). Both CAR1DAY and CAR2DAY were significantly 
positive. In other words, international acquisitions by Indian firms, on average, brought gains to 
their shareholders. The acquisitions were therefore synergistic in general (Hypothesis 1).
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Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
CAR1DAY -16.54 -1.35 1.13 1.57 3.68 25.55
CAR2DAY -17.92 -1.47 1.18 1.92 5.53 38.11
Firm Size 4.540 7.320 7.981 8.163 9.057 12.560
Firm Performance -0.148 0.076 0.125 0.144 0.201 0.611
Exchange Rate -28.230 -6.157 -0.090 -0.410 5.692 16.450
Promoter Stake 1 – 111, 0 – 135
Relatedness 1 – 170, 0 – 76
Prior Experience 1 – 69, 0 – 177
Int Experience 1 – 174, 0 – 72
CAR1DAY CAR2DAY Relatedness Firm Size
CAR1DAY 1.0000 0.8037 0.0310 -0.0874 0.0824 -0.0826 0.0206 -0.0739 -0.1379
CAR2DAY 0.8037 1.0000 0.0162 -0.0969 0.0611 -0.0708 -0.0428 -0.1381 -0.1372
Exchange Rate 0.0310 0.0162 1.0000 -0.0477 0.0902 -0.0530 0.0048 0.0296 -0.0815
International Experience -0.0874 -0.0969 -0.0477 1.0000 0.4016 0.0726 -0.0631 0.1575 0.2983
Prior Experience 0.0824 0.0611 0.0902 0.4016 1.0000 -0.0917 -0.0024 0.1672 0.0932
Relatedness -0.0826 -0.0708 -0.0530 0.0726 -0.0917 1.0000 0.0936 0.0672 -0.0865
Promoter Stake 0.0206 -0.0428 0.0048 -0.0631 -0.0024 0.0936 1.0000 0.1895 -0.1011
Firm Performance -0.0739 -0.1381 0.0296 0.1575 0.1672 0.0672 0.1895 1.0000 -0.0296
Firm Size -0.1379 -0.1372 -0.0815 0.2983 0.0932 -0.0865 -0.1011 -0.0296 1.0000
Exchange 
Rate
International 
Experience
Prior 
Experience
Promoter 
Stake
Firm 
Performance
Table 3. One Sample t-tests for CAR
The regression results are tabulated in Table 4. Firm size was significantly negative for both 
CAR1DAY  and  CAR2DAY.  Firm  performance  was  significant  for  CAR2DAY  but  not  for 
CAR1DAY. These results confirm that larger firms are prone to hubris, leading to a negative 
impact on shareholder wealth. Results for firm performance were mixed and therefore further 
studies  are  needed  before  a  strong  conclusion  can  be  made.  The  promoter  stake  was  not 
significant in any of the models and therefore there was no evidence of any significant influence 
of managerialism. The relatedness of the target industry with the acquiring firm industry was not 
significant. This result supports the argument that relatedness alone is not sufficient for positive 
shareholder gains (Barney, 1983). Changes in the value of target currency with respect to the 
home currency (Indian Rupee) were also insignificant. This may be due to the fact that a large 
number  of  Indian  firms  have  used  the  international  financial  markets  to  raise  money  and 
therefore the financing of the deal may be independent of the home currency fluctuations vis a 
vis the target country currency. The acquisition experience in the target country was significantly 
positive in both models while the international experience was not significant in either. These 
results  lend  support  to  Haleblian  and  Finkelstein's  (1999)  argument  that  inappropriate 
generalization  of  previous  experience  to  dissimilar  situations  may  not  lead  to  performance 
benefits.  
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t df 95% Confidence Interval
CAR1DAY 4.832 245 0.93 2.2
CAR2DAY 4.543 245 1.09 2.75
Table 4. Regression Results
CONCLUSION
International  acquisitions  done  by Indian  firms  have  created  value  for  their  shareholders  in 
general.  Large firms, however, had a negative impact on shareholder returns due to hubris. They 
need  to  be  careful,  therefore,  not  to  overstep  the  boundaries  of  caution  while  exploring 
opportunities abroad. Managerialism was not found to be significant and therefore the returns are 
similar irrespective of whether owners themselves are managers or not. Either the problem of 
managerialism  is  not  as  severe  as  the  theory  suggests  or  the  mechanisms  to  contain  errant 
behavior of managers are strong enough to prevent them from going astray.
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P-value P-value
Intercept 6.8891 0.0015 ** 9.7838 0.0005 ***
2.1397 2.7721
Firm Size -0.4862 0.0501 + -0.6547 0.0417 *
0.2469 0.3198
Firm Performance -4.9389 1.1837 -10.3367 0.0323 *
3.7045 4.7993
Promoter Stake 0.2624 0.6925 -0.3970 0.6444
0.6629 0.8589
Exchange Rate 0.0016 0.9673 -0.0074 0.8862
0.0398 0.0516
Relatedness -0.7908 0.2674 -0.7595 0.4107
0.7113 0.9216
Prior Experience 1.5277 0.0566 + 1.8615 0.0728 +
0.7973 1.0329
Int Experience -0.9089 0.2692 -1.2086 0.2568
0.8207 1.0632
R-sq 0.0496 0.0591
F 1.775 2.135
N 246 246
CAR1DAY 
(-1 to +1)
CAR2DAY 
(-2 to +2)
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Distribution of Deals by Target Country
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No of Deals Country
80 United States
29 United Kingdom
17 Germany
11 Italy
9 Singapore, South Africa
7 France
6 Canada, Belgium
5 Netherlands, Malaysia
4 Poland, Spain, Switzerland
3 Norway, Czech Republic, Thailand, Portugal
2 Brazil, Japan, Sweden, Russia, Ireland, Romania
1
Bangladesh, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia, Peru, 
Denmark, Egypt, Israel, Chile, China, Cyprus, South Korea, 
Nigeria, Fiji, Greece, Hungary
Appendix B. Distribution of Deals by Industry
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Industry
28 Chemicals and allied products 82
73 Business services 61
37 Transportation equipment 17
22 Textile mill products 14
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 11
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 9
33 Primary metal industries 6
30 Rubber & miscellaneous plastics products 6
20 Food and kindred products 6
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 5
34 Fabricated metal products 4
87 Engineering and management services 4
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging place 3
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 3
15 General building contractors 2
48 Communications 2
60 Depository institutions 1
50 Wholesale trade – durable goods 1
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 1
82 Educational services 1
67 Holding and other investment offices 1
23 Apparel and other textile products 1
27 Printing and Publishing 1
31 Leather and leather products 1
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1
46 Pipelines, except natural gas 1
16 Heavy construction contractors 1
Total 246
2 digit 
SIC 
Code
No of 
Deals
